Previous post: What is combinatorics and what this blog is about according to Igor Pak.
There is a new thread of comments to the post "What is mathematics?" started by Sandro Magi. The post is dated April 3; this thread started on May 31. The thread is concerned with only one claim in that post: proofs are not needed at all for applications of mathematics.
Unfortunately, the very first phrase of Sandro Magi set the tone for the rest of the discussion: "This is blatantly false". I do not like to discuss things in such a manner: with a total lack of cooperation. The combinatorialists at Gowers's blog are much more friendly even after a direct attack on their field. But, I believe that the reason is not any kind of malice of either party. This dialog is a good illustration of the near impossiblity of people thinking linearly and verbally to understand people thinking visually. In this case the dialog of a mathematician (every mathematician thinks at least partially visually) and a software engineer turned out to be impossible. I encountered the same sort of difficulties while discussing essentially any other subject, from the movies to the current affairs. I see also this lack of understanding of visual and "the big picture" issues in the design and functionality of almost all the software.
Still, it seems to me that there are some important ideas in that discussion. Of course, it would be better to give a coherent exposition. But an attempt to write it would take a lot of time, and who knows when it would be ready.
If somebody wants to comment on any issue there, I suggest to post comments here; this will result in a more clear structure of comments. As an additional benefit for the next 30 days the comments here are not moderated; they are moderated at that post. This rule is subject to change without notice. :-) I would like to ask Sandro Magi to continue our discussion in comments to "What is mathematics?" and not here (of course, he is under not obligation to continue); then the whole discussion will be at the same place.
Next post: 2014 Fields medalists?.
Showing posts with label discussions. Show all posts
Showing posts with label discussions. Show all posts
Tuesday, June 11, 2013
Wednesday, March 27, 2013
The value of insights and the identity of the author
Previous post: Hard, soft, and Bott periodicity - Reply to T. Gowers.
This is partially a reply to a comment by Emmanuel Kowalski.
There is a phenomenon which I can hardly explain. For example, E. Kowalski said in the linked comment that he cannot comment on my statements (it seems that he is not addressing me at all, he is just commenting) without making assumptions about me, i.e. without using ad hominem arguments. Why he cannot write about my ideas without knowing my personal details?
It seems that E. Kowalski suspects that my opinions are somehow deducible from my personal life circumstances, my biography, etc.
In fact, it is possible that I have more experience due to my biography than most of other mathematicians. This is even partially the case, but only partially, and this does not affect my opinions about mathematical theories. These aspects of my life experience are quite obvious already in the discussion in the Gowers's blog.
But my opponents do not seem to adhere to this theory, which is obviously favoring me. Rather, it seems that they believe I am not knowledgeable enough or plain stupid. Would this be the case, my conclusions would be, most likely, wrong and, moreover, it would be quite easy to refute them without making any assumptions about me.
In fact, one of the main reasons for my semi-anonymity is that I would like to see my arguments and opinions evaluated on their intrinsic merits, without knowing if am I married or not, how good or bad is my employer - name anything you would like to know.
This phenomenon is not limited to my opponents. Somebody, apparently sympathetic to me, wrote: I’d be very interested in any small mathematical insight you might be willing to share, if you’re whom I conjecture you are". So, even my mathematical insights are interesting or not depending on who I am. For me, the interest of a mathematical (or “meta-mathematical”, like this discussion) insight does not depend on whom it belongs.
Of course, sometimes the authorship matters. But assumptions about the author still do not. Let us imagine that it is 1976 today (many other years will work also). Then any person interested in algebra, algebraic topology, or Grothendieck algebraic geometry knows that all papers by D. Quillen to date are very interesting and often contain incredibly deep insights. It is only natural to be interested in any new paper by Quillen. I don’t know anybody working now and comparable in this respect to 1976 Quillen; this is the reason for an exercise in time travel.
At the same time, if I see an interesting result, theory, insight, it does not matter for me if it is published in Annals or in Amer. Math. Monthly, who is the author, and what problems in life she or he has, if any.
In both situations the insights of a person lead to her or his reputation. The reputation itself does not make all insights of this person interesting. Only in rare cases the reputation may suggest that it is worthwhile to pay attention to works of a person.
Unfortunately, this seems to be not true nowadays at least in the West. The relatively recent cult of Fields medals makes the work and the area of any new winner instantly interesting. In the past the presenters of the awarded medals used to stress that there is at least 30-40 young mathematicians with comparable achievements. Not anymore. In the US, one will be monetarily rewarded for a trivial paper in Annals, but never for an expository paper (and no books, please, I was told many years ago), no matter how deep its insights. Papers in a European journal are treated by default as second rate papers. An insight of a person working in Ivy League is more valuable that a much deeper insight of a person working in Alabama. And so on.
Finally, I would like to make an offer to Emmanuel Kowalski (only to him).
Dear Emmanuel Kowalski,
You may ask me in comments here anything you would like to know. I do not promise to answer all the questions. I will evaluate to what extent my answers will help to sort out my real life identity, and will not answer to the questions which are really helpful in this respect. In particular, I will not tell what my area of research is. I will not answer to the questions which I will deem to be too personal. But if finding out my identity is not your goal, here is your chance to replace your assumptions by the actual knowledge.
Next post: Combinatorics is not a new way of looking at mathematics.
This is partially a reply to a comment by Emmanuel Kowalski.
There is a phenomenon which I can hardly explain. For example, E. Kowalski said in the linked comment that he cannot comment on my statements (it seems that he is not addressing me at all, he is just commenting) without making assumptions about me, i.e. without using ad hominem arguments. Why he cannot write about my ideas without knowing my personal details?
It seems that E. Kowalski suspects that my opinions are somehow deducible from my personal life circumstances, my biography, etc.
In fact, it is possible that I have more experience due to my biography than most of other mathematicians. This is even partially the case, but only partially, and this does not affect my opinions about mathematical theories. These aspects of my life experience are quite obvious already in the discussion in the Gowers's blog.
But my opponents do not seem to adhere to this theory, which is obviously favoring me. Rather, it seems that they believe I am not knowledgeable enough or plain stupid. Would this be the case, my conclusions would be, most likely, wrong and, moreover, it would be quite easy to refute them without making any assumptions about me.
In fact, one of the main reasons for my semi-anonymity is that I would like to see my arguments and opinions evaluated on their intrinsic merits, without knowing if am I married or not, how good or bad is my employer - name anything you would like to know.
This phenomenon is not limited to my opponents. Somebody, apparently sympathetic to me, wrote: I’d be very interested in any small mathematical insight you might be willing to share, if you’re whom I conjecture you are". So, even my mathematical insights are interesting or not depending on who I am. For me, the interest of a mathematical (or “meta-mathematical”, like this discussion) insight does not depend on whom it belongs.
Of course, sometimes the authorship matters. But assumptions about the author still do not. Let us imagine that it is 1976 today (many other years will work also). Then any person interested in algebra, algebraic topology, or Grothendieck algebraic geometry knows that all papers by D. Quillen to date are very interesting and often contain incredibly deep insights. It is only natural to be interested in any new paper by Quillen. I don’t know anybody working now and comparable in this respect to 1976 Quillen; this is the reason for an exercise in time travel.
At the same time, if I see an interesting result, theory, insight, it does not matter for me if it is published in Annals or in Amer. Math. Monthly, who is the author, and what problems in life she or he has, if any.
In both situations the insights of a person lead to her or his reputation. The reputation itself does not make all insights of this person interesting. Only in rare cases the reputation may suggest that it is worthwhile to pay attention to works of a person.
Unfortunately, this seems to be not true nowadays at least in the West. The relatively recent cult of Fields medals makes the work and the area of any new winner instantly interesting. In the past the presenters of the awarded medals used to stress that there is at least 30-40 young mathematicians with comparable achievements. Not anymore. In the US, one will be monetarily rewarded for a trivial paper in Annals, but never for an expository paper (and no books, please, I was told many years ago), no matter how deep its insights. Papers in a European journal are treated by default as second rate papers. An insight of a person working in Ivy League is more valuable that a much deeper insight of a person working in Alabama. And so on.
Finally, I would like to make an offer to Emmanuel Kowalski (only to him).
Dear Emmanuel Kowalski,
You may ask me in comments here anything you would like to know. I do not promise to answer all the questions. I will evaluate to what extent my answers will help to sort out my real life identity, and will not answer to the questions which are really helpful in this respect. In particular, I will not tell what my area of research is. I will not answer to the questions which I will deem to be too personal. But if finding out my identity is not your goal, here is your chance to replace your assumptions by the actual knowledge.
Next post: Combinatorics is not a new way of looking at mathematics.
Sunday, March 24, 2013
Reply to Timothy Gowers
Previous post: Happy New Year!
Here is a reply to a comment by T. Gowers about my post My affair with Szemerédi-Gowers mathematics.
I agree that we have no way to know what will happen with combinatorics or any other branch of mathematics. From my point of view, your “intermediate possibility” (namely, developing some artificial way of conceptualization) does not qualify as a way to make it “conceptual” (actually, a proper conceptualization cannot be artificial essentially by the definition) and is not an attractive perspective at all. By the way, the use of algebraic geometry as a reference point in this discussion is purely accidental. A lot of other branches of mathematics are conceptual, and in every branch there are more conceptual and less conceptual subbranches. As is well known, even Deligne’s completion of proof of Weil’s conjectures was not conceptual enough for Grothendick.
Let me clarify how I understand the term “conceptual”. A theory is conceptual if most of the difficulties were moved from proofs to definitions (i.e. to concepts), or they are there from the very beginning (which may happen only inside of an already conceptual theory). The definitions may be difficult to digest at the first encounter, but the proofs are straightforward. A very good and elementary example is provided by the modern form of the Stokes theorem. In 19th century we had the fundamental theorem of calculus and 3 theorems, respectively due to Gauss-Ostrogradsky, Green, and Stokes, dealing with more complicated integrals. Now we have only one theorem, usually called Stokes theorem, valid for all dimensions. After all definitions are put in place, its proof is trivial. M. Spivak nicely explains this in the preface to his classics, “Calculus on manifolds”. (I would like to note in parentheses that if the algebraic concepts are chosen more carefully than in his book, then the whole theory would be noticeably simpler and the definitions would be easier to digest. Unfortunately, such approaches did not found their way into the textbooks yet.) So, in this case the conceptualization leads to trivial proofs and much more general results. Moreover, its opens the way to further developments: the de Rham cohomology turns into the most natural next thing to study.
I think that for every branch of mathematics and every theory such a conceptualization eventually turns into a necessity: without it the subject grows into a huge body of interrelated and cross-referenced results and eventually falls apart into many to a big extent isolated problems. I even suspect that your desire to have a sort of at least semi-intelligent version of MathSciNet (if I remember correctly, you wrote about this in your GAFA 2000 paper) was largely motivated by the difficulty to work in such a field.
This naturally leads us to one more scenario (the 3rd one, if we lump together your “intermediate” scenario with the failure to develop a conceptual framework) for a not conceptualized theory: it will die slowly. This happens from time to time: a lot of branches of analysis which flourished at the beginning of 20th century are forgotten by now. There is even a recent example involving a quintessentially conceptual part of mathematics and the first Abel prize winner, J.-P. Serre. As H. Weyl stressed in his address to 1954 Congress, the Fields medal was awarded to Serre for his spectacular work (his thesis) on spectral sequences and their applications to the homotopy groups, especially to the homotopy groups of spheres (the problem of computing these groups was at the center of attention of leading topologists for about 15 years without any serious successes). Serre did not push his method to its limits; he already started to move to first complex manifolds, then algebraic geometry, and eventually to the algebraic number theory. Others did, and this quickly resulted in a highly chaotic collection of computations with the Leray-Serre spectral sequences plus some elementary consideration. Assuming the main properties of these spectral sequences (which can be used without any real understanding of spectral sequences), the theory lacked any conceptual framework. Serre lost interest even in the results, not just in proofs. This theory is long dead. The surviving part is based on further conceptual developments: the Adams spectral sequence, then the Adams-Novikov spectral sequence. This line of development is alive and well till now.
Another example of a dead theory is the Euclid geometry.
In view of all this, it seems that there are only the following options for a mathematical theory or a branch of mathematics: to continuously develop proper conceptualizations or to die and have its results relegated to the books for gifted students (undergraduate students in the modern US, high school students in some other places and times).
Next post: Reply to JSE.
Here is a reply to a comment by T. Gowers about my post My affair with Szemerédi-Gowers mathematics.
I agree that we have no way to know what will happen with combinatorics or any other branch of mathematics. From my point of view, your “intermediate possibility” (namely, developing some artificial way of conceptualization) does not qualify as a way to make it “conceptual” (actually, a proper conceptualization cannot be artificial essentially by the definition) and is not an attractive perspective at all. By the way, the use of algebraic geometry as a reference point in this discussion is purely accidental. A lot of other branches of mathematics are conceptual, and in every branch there are more conceptual and less conceptual subbranches. As is well known, even Deligne’s completion of proof of Weil’s conjectures was not conceptual enough for Grothendick.
Let me clarify how I understand the term “conceptual”. A theory is conceptual if most of the difficulties were moved from proofs to definitions (i.e. to concepts), or they are there from the very beginning (which may happen only inside of an already conceptual theory). The definitions may be difficult to digest at the first encounter, but the proofs are straightforward. A very good and elementary example is provided by the modern form of the Stokes theorem. In 19th century we had the fundamental theorem of calculus and 3 theorems, respectively due to Gauss-Ostrogradsky, Green, and Stokes, dealing with more complicated integrals. Now we have only one theorem, usually called Stokes theorem, valid for all dimensions. After all definitions are put in place, its proof is trivial. M. Spivak nicely explains this in the preface to his classics, “Calculus on manifolds”. (I would like to note in parentheses that if the algebraic concepts are chosen more carefully than in his book, then the whole theory would be noticeably simpler and the definitions would be easier to digest. Unfortunately, such approaches did not found their way into the textbooks yet.) So, in this case the conceptualization leads to trivial proofs and much more general results. Moreover, its opens the way to further developments: the de Rham cohomology turns into the most natural next thing to study.
I think that for every branch of mathematics and every theory such a conceptualization eventually turns into a necessity: without it the subject grows into a huge body of interrelated and cross-referenced results and eventually falls apart into many to a big extent isolated problems. I even suspect that your desire to have a sort of at least semi-intelligent version of MathSciNet (if I remember correctly, you wrote about this in your GAFA 2000 paper) was largely motivated by the difficulty to work in such a field.
This naturally leads us to one more scenario (the 3rd one, if we lump together your “intermediate” scenario with the failure to develop a conceptual framework) for a not conceptualized theory: it will die slowly. This happens from time to time: a lot of branches of analysis which flourished at the beginning of 20th century are forgotten by now. There is even a recent example involving a quintessentially conceptual part of mathematics and the first Abel prize winner, J.-P. Serre. As H. Weyl stressed in his address to 1954 Congress, the Fields medal was awarded to Serre for his spectacular work (his thesis) on spectral sequences and their applications to the homotopy groups, especially to the homotopy groups of spheres (the problem of computing these groups was at the center of attention of leading topologists for about 15 years without any serious successes). Serre did not push his method to its limits; he already started to move to first complex manifolds, then algebraic geometry, and eventually to the algebraic number theory. Others did, and this quickly resulted in a highly chaotic collection of computations with the Leray-Serre spectral sequences plus some elementary consideration. Assuming the main properties of these spectral sequences (which can be used without any real understanding of spectral sequences), the theory lacked any conceptual framework. Serre lost interest even in the results, not just in proofs. This theory is long dead. The surviving part is based on further conceptual developments: the Adams spectral sequence, then the Adams-Novikov spectral sequence. This line of development is alive and well till now.
Another example of a dead theory is the Euclid geometry.
In view of all this, it seems that there are only the following options for a mathematical theory or a branch of mathematics: to continuously develop proper conceptualizations or to die and have its results relegated to the books for gifted students (undergraduate students in the modern US, high school students in some other places and times).
Next post: Reply to JSE.
Tuesday, January 1, 2013
Reply to a comment
Previous post: Freedom of speech in mathematics
This is a reply to a recent comment by an Anonymous.
Dear Anonymous,
Thank you very much for reading these notes and for writing a serious and stimulating comment. I was thinking about it for a few days, and I am still not sure that my reply will be convincing. But let me try.
The initial goal of this blog was to provide a context for my arguments in Gowers's blog and in another blog. The latter was quoted by another anonymous in Gowers’s blog, and I had no other choice as to try to explain them (the original comment was addressed to people who know me and my views fairly well). So, the concentration on Gowers's views and activities was only natural; this was the intention. Now this topic is more or less exhausted, and expanding the scope of the blog, or even changing it completely may be in order.
Gowers himself described his goals and said that achieving them will eliminate mathematics as we know it. There is nothing apocalyptic in my discussion of his ideas. I do not anticipate that he or his followers will achieve his goals. I do not think that humans are some sort of computers, and I do not think that computers can do real mathematics (definitely, they can do a lot of mathematical things better than humans, but only when a class of problems was completely understood by humans). But he may achieve his goal in an Orwellian way by changing the meaning of the word “mathematics”. He already shifted the preferences of a big part of mathematical community. It took about ten years. If he will be able to do a comparable feat in the next ten years, and then, may be with his followers, once more, “mathematics” will mean “Hungarian-style combinatorics”. And I do believe that the Hungarian-style combinatorics is a field where computers eventually will be superior to humans because a nearly exhaustive search for a proof will be more efficient than human insights (like it happened with chess, which is actually a branch of combinatorics).
Independently of this scenario, I believe that having a person intended to eliminate mathematics (even if his goal is not achievable) in position of such influence as Gowers is extremely unhealthy and dangerous.
I agree that an “open and critical analysis of very influential individuals or groups in the mathematics research community” is highly desirable. But I am not quite comfortable with the way you wrote about this: “what the discussion should be about”. First of all, I am not comfortable with writing this either, but this is my blog and I write about whatever I like and whenever I like. Perhaps, you meant to apply “should” not to me, but to the mathematical community itself. I will assume that this is what you meant.
I believe that such a discussion is hardly possible. As a rule, mathematicians strongly dislike to openly discuss any contentious issues. One may see this everywhere: from insignificant issues on a department of mathematics to major decision made by the AMS or Fields Medals Committee, for example. I would suggest these posts for publication in the Notices of the AMS (under my real name) if I would believe that there is some chance for them to be published.
To Editors of the Notices of the AMS: this is a challenge. Prove that I am wrong!
Anyhow, I am willing to participate in such an open discussion. There is no venue for this now. Still, I would be glad to expand this blog into such a venue. For example, it may be easily transformed into a collective blog, and, for example, you will be able to post here. You will need only a Google account for this, and I will need to know the name of the account and some way of verification that it belongs to the Anonymous who wrote the comment. I reserve the right to be the owner of the blog and its moderator (right now it is not moderated, comments appear without my approval). And, may be, I will eventually transfer it to somebody else.
Finally, I disagree that mathematics was “long dominated by geometry, topology, arithmetic geometry, etc.” By some reason the word “geometry” is very popular for a few decades, and topology is usually considered to be a branch of geometry. So, the word “geometry” was appended to almost any good mathematical theory. Say, Non-Commutative Geometry is actually a branch of functional analysis. Arithmetic Geometry is a branch of algebraic number theory. Topology is not a branch of geometry in the classical sense of the word “geometry”. Algebraic Topology is a branch of algebra. Well, I realize that this is a sort of scandalous statement. It took me many years to come to this conclusion. There was a subfield of topology called Geometric Topology (it is hardly alive by now); this would be a nonsense would topology be indeed a branch of geometry.
So, in my opinion mathematics was long dominated by good mathematics, but this is not the case anymore.
Next post: Happy New Year!
This is a reply to a recent comment by an Anonymous.
Dear Anonymous,
Thank you very much for reading these notes and for writing a serious and stimulating comment. I was thinking about it for a few days, and I am still not sure that my reply will be convincing. But let me try.
The initial goal of this blog was to provide a context for my arguments in Gowers's blog and in another blog. The latter was quoted by another anonymous in Gowers’s blog, and I had no other choice as to try to explain them (the original comment was addressed to people who know me and my views fairly well). So, the concentration on Gowers's views and activities was only natural; this was the intention. Now this topic is more or less exhausted, and expanding the scope of the blog, or even changing it completely may be in order.
Gowers himself described his goals and said that achieving them will eliminate mathematics as we know it. There is nothing apocalyptic in my discussion of his ideas. I do not anticipate that he or his followers will achieve his goals. I do not think that humans are some sort of computers, and I do not think that computers can do real mathematics (definitely, they can do a lot of mathematical things better than humans, but only when a class of problems was completely understood by humans). But he may achieve his goal in an Orwellian way by changing the meaning of the word “mathematics”. He already shifted the preferences of a big part of mathematical community. It took about ten years. If he will be able to do a comparable feat in the next ten years, and then, may be with his followers, once more, “mathematics” will mean “Hungarian-style combinatorics”. And I do believe that the Hungarian-style combinatorics is a field where computers eventually will be superior to humans because a nearly exhaustive search for a proof will be more efficient than human insights (like it happened with chess, which is actually a branch of combinatorics).
Independently of this scenario, I believe that having a person intended to eliminate mathematics (even if his goal is not achievable) in position of such influence as Gowers is extremely unhealthy and dangerous.
I agree that an “open and critical analysis of very influential individuals or groups in the mathematics research community” is highly desirable. But I am not quite comfortable with the way you wrote about this: “what the discussion should be about”. First of all, I am not comfortable with writing this either, but this is my blog and I write about whatever I like and whenever I like. Perhaps, you meant to apply “should” not to me, but to the mathematical community itself. I will assume that this is what you meant.
I believe that such a discussion is hardly possible. As a rule, mathematicians strongly dislike to openly discuss any contentious issues. One may see this everywhere: from insignificant issues on a department of mathematics to major decision made by the AMS or Fields Medals Committee, for example. I would suggest these posts for publication in the Notices of the AMS (under my real name) if I would believe that there is some chance for them to be published.
To Editors of the Notices of the AMS: this is a challenge. Prove that I am wrong!
Anyhow, I am willing to participate in such an open discussion. There is no venue for this now. Still, I would be glad to expand this blog into such a venue. For example, it may be easily transformed into a collective blog, and, for example, you will be able to post here. You will need only a Google account for this, and I will need to know the name of the account and some way of verification that it belongs to the Anonymous who wrote the comment. I reserve the right to be the owner of the blog and its moderator (right now it is not moderated, comments appear without my approval). And, may be, I will eventually transfer it to somebody else.
Finally, I disagree that mathematics was “long dominated by geometry, topology, arithmetic geometry, etc.” By some reason the word “geometry” is very popular for a few decades, and topology is usually considered to be a branch of geometry. So, the word “geometry” was appended to almost any good mathematical theory. Say, Non-Commutative Geometry is actually a branch of functional analysis. Arithmetic Geometry is a branch of algebraic number theory. Topology is not a branch of geometry in the classical sense of the word “geometry”. Algebraic Topology is a branch of algebra. Well, I realize that this is a sort of scandalous statement. It took me many years to come to this conclusion. There was a subfield of topology called Geometric Topology (it is hardly alive by now); this would be a nonsense would topology be indeed a branch of geometry.
So, in my opinion mathematics was long dominated by good mathematics, but this is not the case anymore.
Next post: Happy New Year!
Monday, September 24, 2012
Freedom of speech in mathematics
Previous post: Who writes about big questions?
Behind the popular site Mathoverflow there is a less known site meta.mathoverflow.net, having a definitely postmodernist spirit: this is a place where people discuss not the mathematical questions, but what mathematical questions are allowed to be discussed on the front site (other issues about the front site too, of course).
Oops! I said "discussions"! No, discussions are not allowed on Mathoverflow at all. They pretend that the software is not suitable for discussions; in fact it is as suitable as any blog. So, at Metamathoverflow some people (I have no idea who qualifies for participation in Metamathoverflow) discuss what questions may be asked and answered at Mathoverflow. For example, it is not allowed to ask if some (at least some recent) paper is believed to be correct by the experts in the field.
Here is the link to a quite remarkable discussion "Is this question acceptable?: Mochizuki proof of ABC". The AMS reported that Shinichi Mochizuki claimed that he has proved the famous ABC Conjecture; as a place to find some additional information, they referred to the question "What is the underlying vision that Mochizuki pursued when trying to prove the abc conjecture". The part in italics can be deduced from the URL; I just rounded it off in the shortest possible way.
When you follow the AMS link, you will get to a slightly different question "Philosophy behind Mochizuki’s work on the ABC conjecture [closed]". "[Closed]" means that it is impossible to post any answer. The body of the question is:
This question was classified as "subjective and argumentative" and closed by this reason. After reading the postmodernist metadiscussion I realized that the original question was somewhat different, and, moreover, had a different author. Still, it is closed.
Some answers were posted there before the question was closed; they are interesting and informative. Why these people do not allow more answers?
Well, one of the answers sheds some light on how the modern mathematical society functions. Despite Shinichi Mochizuki is highly regarded for his earlier achievements, and despite it was known for quite a while that he is working on the ABC conjecture (unlike A. Wiles or G. Perelman, he wasn't hiding this) almost nobody was reading his papers. So, almost all experts cannot say anything about his solution because they cannot start reading with his last paper.
Looks like nowadays mathematicians are not interested in mathematics for its own sake, they care only about publications and grants. And the specific questions which one may encounter trying to finish the proof of the last lemma in a paper are the most welcome at Mathoverflow.
Next post: Reply to a comment
Behind the popular site Mathoverflow there is a less known site meta.mathoverflow.net, having a definitely postmodernist spirit: this is a place where people discuss not the mathematical questions, but what mathematical questions are allowed to be discussed on the front site (other issues about the front site too, of course).
Oops! I said "discussions"! No, discussions are not allowed on Mathoverflow at all. They pretend that the software is not suitable for discussions; in fact it is as suitable as any blog. So, at Metamathoverflow some people (I have no idea who qualifies for participation in Metamathoverflow) discuss what questions may be asked and answered at Mathoverflow. For example, it is not allowed to ask if some (at least some recent) paper is believed to be correct by the experts in the field.
Here is the link to a quite remarkable discussion "Is this question acceptable?: Mochizuki proof of ABC". The AMS reported that Shinichi Mochizuki claimed that he has proved the famous ABC Conjecture; as a place to find some additional information, they referred to the question "What is the underlying vision that Mochizuki pursued when trying to prove the abc conjecture". The part in italics can be deduced from the URL; I just rounded it off in the shortest possible way.
When you follow the AMS link, you will get to a slightly different question "Philosophy behind Mochizuki’s work on the ABC conjecture [closed]". "[Closed]" means that it is impossible to post any answer. The body of the question is:
“Mochizuki has recently announced a proof of the ABC conjecture. It is far too early to judge its correctness, but it builds on many years of work by him. Can someone briefly explain the philosophy behind his work and comment on why it might be expected to shed light on questions like the ABC conjecture?”
This question was classified as "subjective and argumentative" and closed by this reason. After reading the postmodernist metadiscussion I realized that the original question was somewhat different, and, moreover, had a different author. Still, it is closed.
Some answers were posted there before the question was closed; they are interesting and informative. Why these people do not allow more answers?
Well, one of the answers sheds some light on how the modern mathematical society functions. Despite Shinichi Mochizuki is highly regarded for his earlier achievements, and despite it was known for quite a while that he is working on the ABC conjecture (unlike A. Wiles or G. Perelman, he wasn't hiding this) almost nobody was reading his papers. So, almost all experts cannot say anything about his solution because they cannot start reading with his last paper.
Looks like nowadays mathematicians are not interested in mathematics for its own sake, they care only about publications and grants. And the specific questions which one may encounter trying to finish the proof of the last lemma in a paper are the most welcome at Mathoverflow.
Next post: Reply to a comment
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