About the title

About the title

I changed the title of the blog on March 20, 2013 (it used to have the title “Notes of an owl”). This was my immediate reaction to the news the T. Gowers was presenting to the public the works of P. Deligne on the occasion of the award of the Abel prize to Deligne in 2013 (by his own admission, T. Gowers is not qualified to do this).

The issue at hand is not just the lack of qualification; the real issue is that the award to P. Deligne is, unfortunately, the best compensation to the mathematical community for the 2012 award of Abel prize to Szemerédi. I predicted Deligne before the announcement on these grounds alone. I would prefer if the prize to P. Deligne would be awarded out of pure appreciation of his work.



I believe that mathematicians urgently need to stop the growth of Gowers's influence, and, first of all, his initiatives in mathematical publishing. I wrote extensively about the first one; now there is another: to take over the arXiv overlay electronic journals. The same arguments apply.



Now it looks like this title is very good, contrary to my initial opinion. And there is no way back.
Showing posts with label Personal. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Personal. Show all posts

Wednesday, August 21, 2013

About some ways to work in mathematics

Previous post: New ideas.


From a comment by Tamas Gabal:

“...you mentioned that the problems are often solved by methods developed for completely different purposes. This can be interpreted in two different ways. First - if you work on some problem, you should constantly look for ideas that may seem unrelated to apply to your problem. Second - focus entirely on the development of your ideas and look for problems that may seem unrelated to apply your ideas. I personally lean toward the latter, but your advice may be different.”

Both ways to work are possible. There are also other ways: for example, not to have any specific problem to solve. One should not suggest one way or another as the right one. You should work in the way which suits you more. Otherwise you are unlikely to succeed and you will miss most of the joy.

Actually, my statement did not suggest either of these approaches. Sometimes a problem is solved by discovering a connection between previously unrelated fields, and sometimes a problem is solved entirely within the context in was posed originally. You never know. And how one constantly looks for outside ideas? A useful idea may be hidden deep inside of some theory and invisible otherwise. Nobody studies the whole mathematics in the hope that this will help to solve a specific problem.

I think that it would be better not to think in terms of this alternative at all. You have a problem to solve, you work on it in all ways you can (most of approaches will fail – this is the unpleasant part of the profession), and that’s it. The advice would be to follow development in a sufficiently big chunk of mathematics. Do not limit yourself by, say, algebra (if your field is algebra). The division of mathematics into geometry, algebra, and analysis is quite outdated. Then you may suddenly learn about some idea which will help you.

Also, you do not need to have a problem to begin with. Usually a mathematician starts with a precisely stated problem, suggested by the Ph.D. advisor. But even this is not necessary.

My own way to work is very close to the way M. Atiyah described as his way of work in an interview published in “The Mathematical Intelligencer” in early 1980ies (of course, I do not claim that the achievements are comparable). This interview is highly recommended; it is also highly recommended by T. Gowers. I believe that I explained how I work to a friend (who asked a question similar to yours one) before I read this interview. Anyhow, I described my way to him as follows. I do not work on any specific problem, except of my own working conjectures. I am swimming in mathematics like in a sea or river and look around for interesting things (the river of mathematics carries much more stuff than a real river). Technically this means that I follow various sources informing about the current developments, including talks, I read papers, both current and old ones, and I learn some stuff from textbooks. An advanced graduate level textbook not in my area is my favorite type of books in mathematics. I am doing this because this is that I like to do, not because I want to solve a problem or need to publish 12 papers during next 3 years. From time to time I see something to which, I feel, I can contribute. From time to time I see some connections which were not noticed before.

My work in “my area” started in the following way. I was familiar with a very new theory, which I learned from the only available (till about 2-3 years ago!) source: a French seminar devoted to its exposition. The author never wrote down any details. Then a famous mathematician visited us and gave a talk about a new (not published yet) remarkable theorem of another mathematician (it seems to me that it is good when people speak not only about their own work). The proof used at a key point an outside “Theorem A” by still another mathematicians. The speaker outlined its proof in few phrases (most speakers would just quote Theorem A, so I was really lucky). Very soon I realized (may be the same day or even during the talk) that the above new theory allows at least partially transplant Theorem A in a completely different context following the outline from the talk. But there is a problem: the conclusion of Theorem A tells that you are either in a very nice generic situation, or in an exceptional situation. In my context there are obvious exceptions, but I had no idea if there are non-obvious exceptions, and how to approach any exceptions. So, I did not even started to work on any details. 2-3 years later a preprint arrived in the mail. It was sent to me by reasons not related at all with the above story; actually, I did not tell anybody about these ideas. The preprint contained exactly what I needed: a proof that there are only obvious exceptional cases (not mentioning Theorem A). Within a month I had a proof of an analogue of Theorem A (this proof was quickly replaced by a better one and I am not able to reproduce it). Naturally, I started to look around: what else can be done in my context. As it turned out, a lot. And the theory I learned from that French seminar is not needed for many interesting things.

Could all this be planned in advance following some advice of some experienced person? Certainly, not. But if you do like this style, my advice would be: work this way. You will be not able to predict when you will discover something interesting, but you will discover. If this style does not appeal to you, do not try.

Note that this style is opposite to the Gowers’s one. He starts with a problem. His belief that mathematics can be done by computers is based on a not quite explicit assumption that his is the only way, and he keeps a place for humans in his not-very-science-fiction at least at the beginning: humans are needed as the source of problems for computers. I don’t see any motivation for humans to supply computers with mathematical problems, but, apparently, Gowers does. More importantly, a part of mathematics which admits solutions of its problems by computers will very soon die out. Since the proofs will be produced and verified by computers, humans will have no source of inspiration (which is the proofs).


Next post: Is algebraic geometry applied or pure mathematics?

Monday, July 29, 2013

Guessing who will get Fields medals - Some history and 2014

Previous post: 2014 Fields medalists?

This was a relatively easy task during about three decades. But it is nearly impossible now, at least if you do not belong to the “inner circle” of the current President of the International Mathematical Union. But they change at each Congress, and one can hardly hope to belong to the inner circle of all of them.

I would like to try to explain my approach to judging a particular selection of Fields medalists and to fairly efficiently guessing the winners in the past. This cannot be done without going a little bit into the history of Fields medals as it appears to a mathematician and not to a historian working with archives. I have no idea how to get to the relevant archives and even if they exist. I suspect that there is no written record of the deliberations of any Fields medal committee.

The first two Fields medals were awarded in 1936 to Lars Ahlfors and Jesse Douglas. It was the first award, and it wasn’t a big deal. It looks like that the man behind this choice was Constantin Carathéodory. I think that this was a very good choice. In my personal opinion, Lars Ahlfors is the best analyst of the previous century, and he did his most important work after the award, which is important in view of the terms of the Fields’ will. Actually, his best work was done after WWII. If not the war, it would be done earlier, but still after the award. J. Douglas solved the main problem about minimal surfaces (in the usual 3-dimensional space) at the time. He did with the bare hands things that we do now using powerful frameworks developed later. I believe that he became seriously ill soon afterward, but today I failed to find online any confirmation of this. Now I remember that I was just told about his illness. Apparently, he did not produce any significant results later. Would he continue to work on minimal surfaces, he could be forced to develop at least some of later tools.

The next two Fields medals were awarded in 1950 and since 1950 from 2 to 4 medals were awarded every 4 years. Initially the International Mathematical Union (abbreviated as IMU) was able to fund only 2 medals (despite the fact that the monetary part is negligible), but already for several decades it has enough funds for 4 medals (the direct monetary value remains to be negligible). I was told that awarding only 2 medals in 2002 turned out to be possible only after a long battle between the Committee (or rather its Chair, S.P. Novikov) and the officials of the IMU. So, I am not alone in thinking that sometimes there are no good enough candidates for 4 medals.

I apply to the current candidates the standard of golden years of both mathematics and the Fields medals. For mathematics, they are approximately 1940-1980, with some predecessors earlier and some spill-overs later. For medals, they are 1936-1986 with some spill-overs later. The whole history of the Fields medals can traced in the Proceedings of Congresses. They are interesting in many other respects too. For example, they contain a lot of very good expository papers (and many more of bad ones). It is worthwhile at least to browse them. Now they are freely available online: ICM Proceedings 1893-2010.

The presentation of work of 1954 medalists J.-P. Serre and K. Kodaira by H. Weyl is a pleasure to read. H. Weyl unequivocally tells that their mathematics is new and went into a new territory and is based on methods unknown to most of mathematicians at the time (in fact, this is still true). He even included an introduction to these methods in the published version.

The 1990 award at the Kyoto Congress was a turning point. Ludwig D. Faddeev was the Chairman of the Fields Medal Committee and the President of the IMU for the preceding 4 years. 3 out of 4 medals went to scientists significant part of whose works was directly related to his or his students’ works. The influence went in both directions: for one winner the influence went mostly from L.D. Faddeev and his pupils, for two other winners their work turned out to be very suitable for a synthesis with some ideas of L.D. Faddeev and his pupils. All these works are related to the theoretical physics. Actually, after reading the recollections of L.D. Faddeev and prefaces to his books, it is completely clear that he is a theoretical physicists at heart, despite he has some interesting mathematical results and he is formally (judging by the positions he held, for example) considered to be a mathematician.

The 1990 was the only year when one of the medals went to a physicist. Naturally, he never proved a theorem. But his papers from 1980-1994 contain a lot of mathematical content, mostly conjectures motivated by quantum field theory reasoning. There is no doubt that his ideas are highly original from the point of view of a mathematician (and much less so from the point of view of someone using Feynman’s integrals daily), that they provided mathematicians with a lot of problems to think about, and indeed resulted in quite interesting developments in mathematics. But many mathematicians, including myself, believe that the Fields medals should be awarded to outstanding mathematicians, and a mathematician should prove his or her claims. I don’t know any award in mathematics which could be awarded for conjectures only.

In 1994 one of the medals went to the son of the President of the IMU at the time. Many people think that this is far beyond any ethical norms. The President could resign from his position the moment the name of his son surfaced. Moreover, he should decline the offer of this position in 1990. It is impossible to believe that that guy did not suspect that his son will be a viable candidate in 2-3 years (if his son indeed deserved the medal). The President of IMU is the person who is able, if he or she wants, to essentially determine the winners, because the selection of the members of the Fields medal Committee is essentially in his or her hands (unless there is a insurrection in the community – but this never happened).

As a result, the system was completely destroyed in just two cycles without any changes in bylaws or procedures (since the procedures are kept in a secret, I cannot be sure about the latter). Still, some really good mathematicians got a medal. Moreover, in 2002 it looked like the system recovered. Unfortunately already in 2006 things were the same as in the 1990ies. One of the awards was outrageous on ethical grounds (completely different from 1994); the long negotiations with Grisha Perelman remind plays by Eugène Ionesco.

In the current situation I would be able to predict the winners if I would knew the composition of the committee. Since this is impossible, I will pretend that the committee is as impartial as it was in 1950-1986. This is almost (but not completely) equivalent to telling my preferences.

I would be especially happy if an impartial committee will award only 2 medals and Manjul Bhargava and Jacob Lurie will be the winners. I hope that their advisors are not on the committee. Their works look very attractive to me. I suspect that Jacob Lurie is the only mathematician working now and comparable with the giants of the golden age. But I do not have enough time to study his papers, or, rather, his books. They are just too long for everybody except people working in the same field. Usually they are hundreds pages long; his only published book (which covers only preliminaries) is almost 1000 pages long. Papers by Manjul Bhargava seem to be more accessible (definitely, they are much shorter). But I am not an expert in his field and I would need to study a lot before jumping into his papers. I do not have enough motivation for this now. An impartial committee would be reinforce my high opinion about their work and provide an additional stimulus to study them deeper. The problem is that I have no reason to expect the committee to be impartial.

Arthur Avila is very strong, or so tell me my expert friends. His field is too narrow for my taste. The main problem is that his case is bound to be political. It depends on the balance of power between, approximately, Cambridge, MA – Berkley and Rio de Janeiro – Paris. Here I had intentionally distorted the geolocation data.

The high ratings in that poll of Manjul Bhargava and Artur Avila are the examples of the “name recognition” I mentioned. I think that an article about Manjul Bhargava appeared even in the New York Times. Being a strong mathematician from a so-called developing country (it seems that the term “non-declining” would be better for English-speaking countries), Artur Avila is known much better than American or British mathematicians of the same level.

Most of mathematicians included in the poll wouldn’t be ever considered by anybody as candidates during the golden age. There would be several dozens of the same level in the same broadly defined area of mathematical. Sections of the Congress can serve as the first approximation to a good notion of an area of mathematics. And a Fields medalist was supposed to be really outstanding. Restricting myself by the poll list I prefer one of the following variants: either Bhargava, or Lurie, or both or no medals for the lack of suitable candidates.



Next post: Did J. Lurie solved any big problem?

Sunday, July 28, 2013

2014 Fields medalists?

Previous post: New comments to the post "What is mathematics?"

I was asked by Tamas Gabal about possible 2014 Fields medalists listed in an online poll. I am neither ready to systematically write down my thoughts about the prizes in general and Fields medals in particular, nor to predict who will get 2014 medals. I am sure that the world would be better without any prizes, especially without Fields medals. Also, in my opinion, no more than two persons deserve 2014 Fields medals. Instead of trying to argue these points, I will quote my reply to Tamas Gabal (slightly edited).

Would I know who the members of the Fields medal committee are, I would be able to predict medalists with 99% confidence. But the composition of the committee is a secret. In the past, the situation was rather different. The composition of the committee wasn't important. When I was just a second year graduate student, I compiled a list of 10 candidates, among whom I considered 5 to have significantly higher chances (I never wrote down this partition, and the original list is lost for all practical purposes). All 4 winners were on the list. I was especially proud of predicting one of them; he was a fairly nontraditional at the time (or so I thought). I cannot do anything like this now without knowing the composition of the committee. Recent choices appear to be more or less random, with some obvious exceptions (like Grisha Perelman).

Somewhat later I wrote:

In the meantime I looked at the current results of that poll. Look like the preferences of the public are determined by the same mechanism as the preferences for movie actors and actresses: the name recognition.

Tamas Gabal replied:

Sowa, when you were a graduate student and made that list of possible winners, did you not rely on name recognition at least partially? Were you familiar with their work? That would be pretty impressive for a graduate student, since T. Gowers basically admitted that he was not really familiar with the work of Fields medalists in 2010, while he was a member of the committee. I wonder if anyone can honestly compare the depth of the work of all these candidates? The committee will seek an opinion of senior people in each area (again, based on name recognition, positions, etc.) and will be influenced by whoever makes the best case... It's not an easy job for sure.

Here is my reply.

Good question. In order to put a name on a list, one has to know this name, i.e. recognize it. But I knew much more than 10 names. Actually, this is one of the topics I wanted to write about sometime in details. The whole atmosphere at that time was completely different from what I see around now. May be the place also played some role, but I doubt that its role was decisive. Most of the people around me liked to talk about mathematics, and not only about what they were doing. When some guy in Japan claimed that he proved the Riemann hypothesis, I knew about this the same week. Note that the internet was still in the future, as were e-mails. I had a feeling that I know about everything important going on in mathematics. I always had a little bit more curiosity than others, so I knew also about fields fairly remote from own work.

I do not remember all 10 names on my list (I remember about 7), but 4 winners were included. It was quite easy to guess 3 of them. Everybody would agree that they were the main contenders. I am really proud about guessing the 4th one. Nobody around was talking about him or even mentioned him, and his field is quite far from my own interests. To what extent I understood their work? I studied some work of one winner, knew the statements and had some idea about their proof for another one (later the work of both of them influenced a lot my own work, but mostly indirectly), and very well knew what are the achievements of the third one, why they are important, etc. I knew more or less just the statements of two main results of the 4th one, the one who was difficult to guess – for me. I was able to explain why this or that guy got the medal even to a theoretical physicist (actually did on one occasion). But I wasn’t able to teach a topic course about works of any of the 4.

At the time I never heard any complaints that a medal went to a wrong person. The same about all older awards. There was always a consensus in the mathematical community than all the people who got the medal deserved it. May be somebody else also deserved it too, but there are only 3 or 4 of them each time.

Mathematics is a human activity. This is one of the facts that T. Gowers prefers to ignore. Nobody verifies proofs line by line. Initially, you trust your guts feelings. If you need to use a theorem, you will be forced to study the proof and understand its main ideas. The same is true about the deepness of a result. You do not need to know all the proofs in order to write down a list like my list of 10 most likely winners (next time my list consisted of no more than 5 or 6, all winner were included). It seems that I knew the work of all guessed winners better than Gowers knew the work of 2010 medalists. But even if not, there is a huge difference between a graduate student trying to guess the current year winners, and a Fellow of the London Royal Society, a Fields medalist himself, who is deciding who will get 2010 medals. He should know more.

The job is surely not an easy one now, when it is all about politics. Otherwise it would be very pleasant.

Next post: Guessing who will get Fields medals - Some history and 2014.

Sunday, May 20, 2012

The Politics of Timothy Gowers. 1

Previous post: My affair with Szemerédi-Gowers mathematics.


I mentioned in a comment in a blog that a substantial part of activity of Timothy Gowers in recent ten or more years is politics. It seems that this claim needs to be clarified. I will start with the definitions of the word “politics” in Merriam-Webster online. There are several meanings, of which the following (3a, 5a, 5b) are the most relevant.

3
a : political affairs or business; especially : competition between competing interest groups or individuals for power and leadership (as in a government).

5
a : the total complex of relations between people living in society
b : relations or conduct in a particular area of experience especially as seen or dealt with from a political point of view .

It seems that the interpretation of T. Gowers himself is based only on the most objectionable meaning, namely:

3
c : political activities characterized by artful and often dishonest practices.

I am not in the position to judge how artful the politics of Gowers is; its results suggest that it is highly artful. But I have no reason to suspect any dishonest practices.

With only one exception, I was (and I am) observing Gowers activities only online (this includes preprints and publications, of course). I easily admit that in this way I may get a distorted picture. But this online-visible part does exist, and this part is mostly politics of mathematics, not mathematics itself.

I do classify as politics things like “The Princeton Companion to Mathematics”, which do not look as such at the first sight. This particular book gives a fairly distorted and at some places an incorrect picture of mathematics, and this is why I consider it as politics – it is an attempt to influence both the wide mathematical public and the mathematicians in power.

I was shocked by Gowers reply to the anonym2’s comment to his post “ICM2010 — Villani laudatio” in his blog. The Gowers blog at the time of 2010 Congress clearly showed that he has almost no idea about the work of mathematicians awarded Fields medals that year. But Gowers was a member of the committee selecting the medalists. “How it could be?” asked anonym2. The reply was very short: “No comment”. This lack of a response (or should I say “this very telling response”?) and the following it explanations of T. Tao clearly showed that the work of the Fields medals committee is now a pure politics, contrary to Tao’s assertion of the opposite. If the members of the committee do not understand the work of laureates, they were not able to base their choices on the substance of the works considered, and only the politics is left. In fact, nowadays it is rather easy to guess which member of the committee was a sponsor for which medalist. This was not the case in the past, and the predictions of the mathematical community were very close to the outcome. I myself, being only a second year graduate student, not even suspecting that there is any politics involved, was able to compile a list of 10 potential Fields medalist for that year, and all four actual medalists were on the list. The question of anonym2 "How could the mathematical community be so wrong in their predictions?" could not even arise at these times.


Next post: Part 2.

My affair with Szemerédi-Gowers mathematics

Previous post: The times of André Weil and the times of Timothy Gowers. 3.


I learned about Szemerédi’s theorem in 1978 from the Séminaire Bourbaki talk by Jean-Paul Touvenot “La démonstration de Furstenberg du théorème de Szemerédi sur les progressions arithmétiques”. As it is clear already from the title, the talk was devoted to the work of Furstenberg and not to the work of Szemerédi.

The theorem itself looked amusing, being a generalization of a very well known theorem of van der Warden. The latter one was, probably, known to every former student of a mathematical school in USSR and was usually considered as a nice toy and a good way to show smart and mathematically inclined kids how tricky the use of the mathematical induction could be. Nobody considered it as a really important theorem or as a result comparable with the main work of van der Warden.

But the fact that such a statement can be proved by an application of the theory of dynamical systems was really surprising. It looks like Bourbaki devoted a talk to this subject exactly for the sake of this unusual at the time application and not for the sake of the theorem itself. According to a maxim attributed to Yu.I. Manin, proofs are more important than theorems, and definitions are more important than proofs. I wholeheartedly agree. In any case, the work of Szemerédi was not reported at the Séminaire Bourbaki. I also was impressed by this application of dynamical systems and later read several initial chapters of Furstenberg’s book. But when I told about this to a young very promising expert in my area of mathematics, I got very cold reception: “This is not interesting at all”. Even references to Bourbaki and to the dynamical systems did not help. Now I think that we were both right. The theorem was not interesting because it was (and, apparently, still is) useless for anything but to proving its variations, and it is not sufficiently charming by itself (I think that the weaker van der Warden’s theorem is more charming). The theorem is interesting because it can be proved by tools completely alien to its natural context.

Then I more or less forgot about it, with a short interruption when Furstenberg’s book appeared.

Many years later I learned about T. Gowers from a famous and very remarkable mathematician, whom I will simply call M, short for Mathematician. In 1995 he told me about work of Gowers on Banach spaces, stressing that a great work may be completely unnoticed by the mathematical community. According to M, Gowers solved all open problems about Banach spaces. I had some mixed feelings about this claim and M’s opinion. May be Gowers indeed solved all problems of the Banach spaces theory (it seems that he did not), but who cares? For outsiders the theory of Banach spaces is a dead theory deserving a chapter in Bourbaki’s treatise because its basic theorems (about 80 years old) are exceptionally useful. On the other hand, Gowers was a Congress speaker in 1994, and this means that his work did not went unnoticed. In 1998 Gowers was awarded one of the four Fields medals for that year, quite unexpectedly to every mathematician with whom I discussed 1998 awards (M is not among them). It was also surprising that in his talk on the occasion of the award Gowers spoke not about his work on Banach spaces, but about a new approach to Szemerédi’s theorem. The approach was, in fact, not quite new: it extended the ideas of an early paper by K.-F. Roth on this topic (the paper is a few years earlier than his proof of what is known now as the Tue-Siegel-Roth theorem).

I trusted enough to M’s opinion to conclude that, probably, all work by Gowers deserves attention. So, I paid some attention to his work about Szemerédi’s theorem, but his paper looked technically forbidding (especially given that my main interests always were more or less at the opposite pole of pure mathematics). Then Gowers published a brilliantly written essay “Two cultures in mathematics”. He argued that the mainstream mathematics, best represented by the work of Serre, Atiyah, Grothendieck and their followers (and may be even Witten, despite he is not really a mathematician) is no more than a half of mathematics, “the first culture”, as he called it. Usually it is called “the conceptual mathematics”, since the new concepts are much more important to it than solutions of particular problems (as was already mentioned, the definitions are more important than proofs and theorems). Gowers argued that there is an equally important “second culture”. Apparently, it is best represented by the so-called “Hungarian combinatorics” and the work of Erdös and his numerous collaborators. In this mathematics of “the second culture”, the problems are stressed, the elementary (not involving abstract concepts, but may be very difficult) proofs are preferred, and no rigid structures (like the structure of a simple Lie algebra) are visible. Moreover, Gowers argued that both cultures are similar in several important aspects, despite this is very far from being transparent. A crucial part of his essay is devoted to outlining these similarities. All this was written in an excellent language at the level of best classical fiction literature, and appeared to be very convincing.

I decided to at least attempt to learn something from this “second culture”. Very soon I have had some good opportunities. T. Gowers was giving a series of lectures about his work on Szemerédi’s theorem in a not very far university. I decided to drive there (a roundtrip for each lecture) and attend the lectures. The lectures turned out to be exceptionally good. Then, after I applied some minor pressure to one of my colleagues, he agreed to give a series of lectures about some tools used by Gowers in his work. His presentation was also exceptionally good. I also tried to read relevant chapters in some books. All this turned out to be even more attractive than I expected. I decided to teach a graduate course in combinatorics, and attempted to include some Gowers-style stuff. The latter wasn’t really successful; the subject matter is much more technically difficult (and I do not mean the work of Szemerédi and Gowers) than would be appropriate. Anyhow, over the years I devoted significant time and efforts to familiarize myself with this “second culture” mathematics. This was interrupted both by mathematical reasons (it is nearly impossible to completely switch areas in the western mathematical community), and by some completely external circumstances.

When later I looked anew both at the “second culture” mathematics and at the theory of the “Two cultures in mathematics”, I could not help but to admit that they both lost their appeal. There is no second culture. The fact is that some branches of mathematics are not mature enough to replace assembling long proofs out of many similar pieces by a conceptual framework, making them less elementary, but more clear. The results of the second culture still looked isolated from the mainstream mathematics. I realized that the elementary combinatorial methods of proofs, characteristic for the purported second culture, occur everywhere (including my own work in “the first culture”). I would not say that they are always inevitable, but very often it is simpler to verify some fact by a combinatorial argument than to find a conceptual framework trivializing it.

Perhaps, my opinion about the “second culture” reached its peak on the day (April 8, 2004) of posting to the arXiv of the Green-Tao paper about arithmetic progression of primes. Prime numbers are the central notion of mathematics, and every new result about them is interesting. But gradually it became clear that the Green-Tao paper has nothing to do with primes. Green and Tao proved a generalization of Szemerédi’s theorem. By some completely independent results about primes due to Goldston and Yildirim, the set of primes satisfies the assumptions of the Green-Tao theorem. The juxtaposition of these two independent results leads to a nicely looking theorem. But anything new about primes is contained in the Goldston-Yildirim part, and not in Green-Tao part. This was a big disappointment.

So, the affair ended without any drama, in contrast with the novel “The End of the Affair” by Graham Greene.


Next post: The politics of Timothy Gowers. 1.

Saturday, April 7, 2012

The first post

This is mainly a test of the feel and look of this particular Google template and my customizations of it. A part of the test is the following picture of a little piece of my life.


This close-up photograph was done by me in my office by an outdated cell phone.

So, I am the © copyright holder of this silly picture!

Most of this stuff should either go trash, or be destroyed because it may contain some private information (not about me), or returned to library (now I am very reluctant to return books to the library; they have very high chances to end up in a trash truck there), etc. And some things are valuable. The main problem is to sort out what belong to what category.

Probably, this is sufficient for a test. Good luck!


Next post: A reply to some remarks by André Joyal.